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I SOUTH ASIA THE REGIONAL AND STRATEGIC CONTEXT
South Asia consists of the states bounded by the Himalayas and Hindu Kush 
mountains to the north and west, and the Indian Ocean to the south —  and 
includes India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, Afghanistan, and 
the Maldives [1] Collectively, the region constitutes one quarter of the human 
race, with a population equal to that of Latin America and Africa combined 
Culturally, it is as diverse as all of Europe —  the social distance between 
Pathan and Tamil being about the same as that between Turk and Swede 
Economically, the span is greater, as South Asia contains the world's largest 
concentration of the very poorest of the world —  as well as components of a 
developed, thriving modern economy, especially in India
It is a disservice to speak of South Asia as a "Third World' region, given 
the ambiguity of that term, the diversity of states in the region, and the 
internal heterogeneity of the region's largest state, India [2] Such terms have 
overwhelmed us, and even the Indian government claims membership in the Third 
World", but Jawaharlal Nehru's vehement criticism of the idea of a 'Third Force" 
(the precursor to Third World) bears repeating
What the Third Force means I have been wholly unable to 
understand Numbers do not make a force It will not
make the slightest difference to the great military powers of 
today if the militarily weak countries band themselves 
together If it takes the shape of banding together, even the 
ability to exert moral pressure goes into the background, and 
the physical side canes up We have, therefore, opposed
the idea of a Third Force The moment we talk in these terms, 
we adopt to some extent the cold war approach and language of
2hostility We have enough problems of our own, and such
influence as we have in the world is because of our modesty, 
not because of our shouting [3]
Strategically, the region was often thought to be vulnerable and weak —  as 
indeed it was during the great Islamic invasions from Central Asia in the 14th 
century onward and from the European invasions (by sea) from the 16th century 
onward Earlier history recorded the invasion of Alexander the Great More 
recently, the Japanese invaded in 1943, the Chinese in 1962, and the Soviets 
occupied Afghanistan in late 1979 But this picture of vulnerability is not 
entirely accurate much of Southeast Asia was under Indian cultural influence 
frati the seventh to the thirteenth centuries A D , and the Indian Chola Kingdom 
conducted naval raids m  the Malacca straits m  the eleventh century, parts of 
Tibet and Afghanistan were frequently entered and ruled by Indian and British 
forces Indeed, the British, Portuguese, French, and Dutch all used their South 
Asian territories to support their activities in East and Southeast Asia
British domination of South Asia was made possible by control of the sea, 
which they maintained twenty years after they left India, and careful attention 
to the limitrophic regions of Tibet and Afghanistan At first overreaching 
themselves, they settled on a policy of keeping these two regions out of the 
hands of hostile Czarist or imperial Chinese forces
The popular media would now have it that South Asia was "the Jewel in the 
Crown', and that the British reluctantly departed because of exhaustion This 
is inaccurate India had been a treasure trove of silk, jewels and spices 
through the 19th century But its value declined just as the Raj was at its 
peak First, the Royal Navy canne to be fueled by oil, increasing the relative
3importance of the barren lands between India and the Mediterranean Second, 
India's spices and exotica were less than vital to an industrializing society 
Indeed, as Indian manufactured goods began to compete with British ones, India 
became something of a threat By the 20th century, the South Asian possessions 
came to be of instrumental importance and the Indian army began to play a 
supporting role in the Middle East, the Far East and Southeast Asia The 
defense of India remained important, but was also part of an overall imperial 
defense system [4] From being the jewel m  the crown, India was relegated to a 
position of marginal equality with other regions
The structure that had kept the peace m  South Asia for 150 years was 
shattered by the coming of independence m  1947, and a dominant India found 
itself faced by a lesser, but ideologically potent Pakistan Yet the region as 
a whole was not threatened from the outside Tibet remained a buffer for 
several years, Afghanistan was a weak state, and the ocean was in safe Western 
hands India and Pakistan could 'afford" their 1947-48 conflict since no 
outside power could take advantage of their mutual obsession
This changed quickly Tibet was lost to China in 1949, with Nehru's 
acquiescence, enabling the Chinese to confront and defeat India m  1962, the 
British withdrew from the Indian Ocean m  1968 and the O S ,  distracted by 
Vietnam, failed to make a smooth transition, finally, Afghanistan became linked 
to the Soviet Union after the 1978 coup Gradually, the conflict between India 
and Pakistan has been played out under new rules as one major power after 
another established themselves on the region's kashmir periphery Today, it not 
only features indirect involvement by the U S , the Soviet Union, and China, but 
apotential nuclear breakout Further, other regional conflicts —  stemming
4largely from ethnic and religious causes —  have sprung up, providing new 
opportunities for the intervention of outside powers
II REGIONAL CONFLICT AND EXTERNAL INVOLVEMENT
Excluding Afghanistan (discussed m  Robert Litwak's chapter), what are the 
most important regional conflicts in terms of their potential for the induction 
of outside powers"'* The chief among these must be the India-Pakistan dispute, 
which at various times has involved the U S , China, Great Britain, the Soviet 
Union arri several Middle Eastern states, and which may soon assume a nuclear 
dimension, other important regional conflicts include those between India and 
Sri Lanka and India arri China Finally, there are several intrastate conflicts 
which have the potential for involvement of one or more outside and regional 
states
The India Pakistan Conflicts
India and Pakistan have fought one minor and two major wars, m  1947-48, 
1965 and 1971 The latter led to the destruction of the old Pakistan, and the 
creation of a new state, Bangladesh These wars have involved hundreds of 
thousands of troops and millions of dollars of military equipment, most of it 
imported Indo-Pakistani conflict has a special quality about it more than
one general on either side has characterized these struggles as "communal riots 
with armor " The very identities of Pakistan (an avowedly Islamic state) and 
India (a predominately Hindu, but secular state with a large Muslim minority) 
stand as a challenge to each other The continuing struggle over Kashmir— with
5its predanmately Muslim population — is widely described as either one of the 
main causes of conflict between the two states or as a consequence of their 
mutual distrust, it may be both at the same time [5]
India and Pakistan have maintained most of their armed forces m  opposition 
to each other since their initial conflict over Kashmir in 1948 Interestingly, 
even before they went to war m  1947-48, and even before India was partitioned 
and given independence, there were attempts by regional leaders to involve ma]or 
external powers m  regional affairs Stressing the threatening nature of the 
Soviet Union, Indian officials suggested that they would like to receive 
assistance from America which the British could or would not provide Six 
months before independence, Nehru's ambassador, Asaf All, told the Americans 
that India could "become a bastion for the world against the great northern 
neighbor which now cast its shadow over two continents, Asia and Europe [6]
By October 1948, both India and Pakistan had made formal requests to the 
U S for military assistance The Pakistani request was particularly large 
The American response was cautious It denied requests from both states, and in 
internal documents noted the importance of maintaining good relations with both 
South Asian states using U S support "as an instrument to effect cooperation 
within the region " Assistance to one country that alienated the other would be 
self-defeating, "therefore a regional approach is necessary," although India was 
recognized as the "natural political and economic center of South Asia "[7]
With four exceptions, this response fixed the pattern of American 
involvement m  the India-Pakistan conflict The exceptions have been 
significant, but have not altered basic policy The first was the 1954-65 U S 
grant and sales program to Pakistan, which built up the Pakistan armed forces to 
considerable strength The program was initiated in response to Soviet
6expansion in East Europe and the Korean War, but was not directed against India 
India was offered military aid on the same terms, but refused, it did accept a 
much larger economic assistance program than Pakistan
The second exception to this American policy was the short-lived (1963-65) 
arms aid program to India This was m  response to the Chinese-Indian war, and 
resulted m  about $90 million m  grant military aid The third (very brief) 
exception occurred during the 1971 India-Pakistan conflict over East Pakistan 
when the U S consciously "tilted” m  favor of Pakistan— but did not provide any 
significant amount of military assistance The final exception, a response to 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, has been the recent arms sales program 
(which broke the fourth arms embargo that the U S had placed on Pakistan), 
which will run through 1987
Despite these four exceptions, the basic assumption of American policy has 
not changed At no time has the U S seriously considered allying with India or 
Pakistan in such a way that would destroy relations with the other During 
1953-65, India received special economic consideration, and during the current 
arms sales program to Pakistan the Reagan administration has been careful to 
keep open its lines of communication to New Delhi, there is even current 
optimism about the future of U S -Indian relations
The involvement of other major powers in the Indo-Pakistan conflict has 
also been guided by strategic, not regional, calculations The Soviet Union had 
identified India as an important country m  the mid- and late-fifties as it was 
emerging from its own self-imposed isolation India was seen as the gateway to 
the non-aligned world, and then as an important alternative to China As their 
relationship with China deteriorated the Soviets hesitated and then (after the 
1962 India-China war) began to provide India with very modern weapons —
7helicopters and MiG-21 aircraft The Indians preferred Western assistance and 
weapons, but when the latter lost interest in South Asia after 1964-5 the 
Soviets stepped m  They managed to become the peacemaker between India and 
Pakistan after the 1965 war— with American approval— and then even entered into 
a limited military relationship with Pakistan, hoping to wean that state away 
from both America and China
China assumed the role of major military supplier to Pakistan in 1966 and 
Chinese and French weapons (the latter purchased on commercial terms) 
constituted the most modern elements of the Pakistan armed forces through 1981
In quantitative and qualitative terms, the most significant current 
external involvement in the Subcontinent is that associated with the Soviet arms 
program m  India India made a few purchases from abroad after the 1971 war 
with Pakistan, but the Janata government negotiated a billion dollar arms deal 
that was signed by Mrs Gandhi in 1981, and her government then negotiated two 
others that were even larger
India's dependence upon foreign arms is in part a response to Pakistan's 
new American supplies, but also the consequence of the failure of its own arms 
industry to produce modern systems Despite years of effort, the Indians have 
not been able to produce a modern fighter or an effective tank and have now 
turned to Soviet designs Since the terms of the Soviet arms deals are not 
known, it may be that in addition to valuing India's role as a de facto balancer 
of China, and in addition to Indian diplomatic support m  Southeast Asia and 
even Afghanistan, the Soviets see India as a lucrative customer for their arms 
I incline to the view that the Soviets chiefly value Indian strategic and 
political support, but it may well be that they also make a profit from the arms 
deals [8]
8To summarize, the dominant expression of external involvement m  South Asia 
has been through arms transfers These generally reflected American, Soviet and 
Chinese calculations of broader strategic objectives, not specific^ regional 
interests This interpretation is sustained by the behavior of the two 
superpowers and China during major regional crises The 1947-48 conflict in 
Kashmir resulted in an American arms embargo to both India and Pakistan, not 
further involvement The 1965 Indo-Pakistan war led to another embargo of 
American arms to India and Pakistan and the Soviet Union and China carefully 
avoided any direct role (although the Chinese increased the pitch of its 
rhetoric by many decibels) In 1971, when the Soviets were clearly supporting 
India, and the U S and China were clearly supporting Pakistan, none of these 
powers did more than ship weapons already agreed upon In the Soviet-Indian 
case, this was quite substantial, but in the American case, even these were not 
supplied because of another embargo And, despite the much heralded sailing of 
the Enterprise towards the Bay of Bengal (which it did not quite reach) , Soviet 
and American fleets kept apart from each other This sailing was as symbolic as
its 1962 sailing on behalf of India into the Bay of Bengal during the 
Smo-Indian war [9]
Both the superpowers seem to believe that no purely regional conflict has 
been important enough for them to either commit their own forces directly, or to 
challenge the role of the other superpower This reluctance is especially noted 
by Pakistan, the weaker of the two regional powers, and no issue is more 
sensitive than the question of whether the U S will come to Pakistan's support 
m  case of another conflict with India This is an important question, and 
deserves further analysis
Pakistan has always regarded the arms supply relationship with the U S as
9having vital political overtones, partly because of the excessive expectations 
associated with the alliance in the 1950s, but primarily because of the 
overwhelming impact of the U S program on the development of Pakistan's armed 
forces, the arms tie was seen as central to the survival of Pakistan itself 
This perception faded in the 1960s and 1970s when China and other states 
provided arms to Pakistan [10]
Because of this perception of centrality, there was always an assumption 
that the U S would support Pakistan against its chief enemy, India, an 
assumption privately fostered by some American officials, and which would seem 
to exceed the 1959 agreement upon which the current relationship now rests 
Yet, one administration after another had publicly stated that the U S arms 
were meant for defense against the Soviet Union, not India No American 
administration has wanted to encourage the Pakistanis to attack India, or to 
commit the U S  to an open-ended conflict Thus, the new relationship, like the 
old one, remains slightly ambiguous the arms are meant for defense against a 
Soviet attack, they may be used for defense against an Indian attack— or even in 
an offensive attack against India
However, would American support Pakistan further the case of a 
Soviet-Pakistani conflict, or an Afghan-Pakistani conflict’ Would the U S then 
provide American aircraft’ Pilots’ Advisers’ Air defense forces’ Ground 
forces’ All of these would be proper within the context of the 1959 agreement, 
but there has been little information as to what contingency plans have been 
discussed
Pakistanis also ask whether the U S would support Pakistan in case of a 
new Indo-Pakistan war Would such support be contingent upon a defensive
Pakistani strategy, or the Indian initiation of such a conflict’ (The present
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force ratios are now very much in India's favor, and Indian armed forces have 
for at least a decade discussed strategies of preemption and first-strike )
There are no satisfactory answers to most of these questions Even the 
1971 American policy— m  which Nixon provided limited military aid and 
substantial symbolic support for Pakistan in exchange for Pakistan's support of 
his opening to China— may not be relevant We simply do not know what the 
Anencan response would be, and those now responsible for such policy probably 
do not know either Gertainly, this ultimate uncertainty is recognized in 
Pakistan, which has been wary of dependency upon the U S and which has 
carefully avoided steps which would compromise or limit its future defense or 
nuclear plans
While Pakistan's position is m  every way more precarious during a future 
Indo-Pakistan war (its army is much smaller, its internal supply lines are all 
exposed to Indian air, ground, and even artillery attack, and it has only one 
easily blockaded port), India has certain vulnerabilities, but almost all of 
them are external India must keep some percentage of its forces facing the 
Chinese, it may not be able to prevent outside powers, including those in the 
Middle East, from flying in aircraft to Pakistan during such a war These two 
concerns are more than balanced by the prospect of support from the Soviet Union 
should a new Indo-Pakistan conflict erupt
Estimates of this do vary My own view has been that India is not likely 
to seek much Soviet support in the event of a future conflict with Pakistan 
since it would not want to allow the Soviets to make any claim upon Pakistani 
territory, moving the Soviet line of control further towards, or even east of, 
the Indus Most Indians see a troublesome but united Pakistan as more m  their
interest than a defeated and truncated Pakistan Some Pakistanis, however, are
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convinced that India's long term plans are to continue the division and 
destruction of Pakistan that was begun in 1971, with or without Soviet 
assistance A few Pakistanis have even argued that Pakistan's true interests 
lie westward, in a closer, more normal relationship with the Soviet Union This 
position apparently is not now held m  Islamabad, but given further evidence of 
American unreliability, Indian hostility, and Pakistani weariness at being the 
hosts to three million troublesome and expensive Afghan refugees, one might yet 
see a revived form of Pakistani 'neutralism "[11]
These two very divergent scenarios— the prospective break-up of Pakistan, 
or the movement of Pakistan towards a closer relationship to the Soviet 
Union— probably do not figure largely m  current Soviet regional policy The 
Soviets have launched a number of public attacks on Pakistan for harboring 
"bandits" but they have also been diplomatically active in Pakistan, trying to 
exploit resentment of the Zia government Their prime concern with Pakistan 
would seem to be Pakistan's limited support for the Mujahiddin However, as 
long as the war m  Afghanistan remains a violent stalemate, it is unlikely that 
the Soviets will greatly escalate their pressure This would activate more 
American support, and Pakistan certainly is a more substantial power than the 
Soviets have faced m  Afghanistan If the time came to deal with Pakistan they 
might invoke the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace and Friendship, but it is more 
likely that they will continue to regard India primarily as a balancer of China 
But these are calculations, not fixed policies, and a new leadership in Moscow 
might be tempted to more actively exploit the Indo-Pakistani conflict to their 
own advantage
The superpowers have generally been at cross-purposes when they involve 
themselves in South Asian matters, however, this was not the case during one
12
brief period, which showed how effective united superpower action could be 
From about 1962 to 1965, and especially during and after the 1965 Indo-Pakistan 
war, both superpowers worked together to reduce Chinese influence m  the 
Subcontinent and to keep India united and strong, should there be a renewal of 
Chinese military pressure After initially persuading them to accept a 
cease-fire, they managed to bring the two countries to the negotiating table at 
Tashkent and to get them to sign an agreement The arrangement might have held 
if internal discontent in Pakistan with the agreement (led by Bhutto) had not 
led to Ayub's removal, and if the superpowers had not then split over the issue 
of Bangladesh
We have so far discussed external involvement in India-Pakistan matters and 
the calculations of the two major South Asian states of their outside support 
vs regional threats It is appropriate to conclude with some remarks about 
India's and Pakistan's reactions to regional threats from the outside 
Unfortunately, this provides a clear measure of the dominance of the 
India-Pakistan conflict over calculations of regional integrity and security
There have been two major incursions from the outside the Chinese-Indi an 
war of 1962 and the Soviet invasion of 1979 The Pakistani reaction (in 1962)to 
the Sino-Indian War was virtually identical to the Indian reaction to the 1979 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan both called for diplomatic rather than military 
steps to remove the offender, both initially underplayed the motives and 
intentions of the outside state, and both had to be pressured by other outside 
states ( m  the first case, Britain and the U S , in the latter, the U S ) before 
issuing even a grudging statement of concern In 1962, Ayub thought the Chinese 
had no intention of invading India India now tends to accept the Soviet claim 
that they have no further ambitions beyond Afghanistan and were drawn into that
13
country because of outside meddling
There is some irony here Pakistan's earlier softness against China cost 
them a good deal of U S support in 1962-65, and Kennedy in particular was 
furious with Pakistani indifference to the supposed Chinese threat to South 
Asia The Indians apparently "learned" from their own extreme reaction to the 
Chinese war that external threats to the region are not as great as had been 
imagined and can at least be managed I believe their calculation is wrong, but 
they have good reasons— other than their continued dependency upon the Soviet 
Union for arms— to be less concerned about the Soviet presence in South Asia 
than the U S Indeed, were it not for the refugee problem, many Pakistanis 
would also regard that presence as tolerable
India and Pakistan the Nuclear Dimension
One final component of the Indo-Pakistani conflict deserves special 
examination, as it has been of particular concern to both superpowers and China 
nuclear proliferation India's own nuclear program received its greatest 
impetus in 1964, with the detonation of a Chinese test explosion While the 
threat from China has faded over the years, reports of a Pakistani nuclear 
program, which first surfaced in the early 1970s, has revived the Indian debate 
Pakistan, of course, was responding to the Indian nuclear program (Mrs Gandhi 
apparently gave approval for the 1974 Pokhran test during or just before the 
1971 war with Pakistan, at a moment when India was uncertain of its outside 
political support) [12]
Two aspects of South Asian proliferation seam to trouble outside powers the 
most The first is the possibility that a regional nuclear weapon will be 
transferred to another region, particularly the Middle East An early
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justification for the Pakistani bomb was that it would be an "Islamic" device, 
and it was in fact partially funded with Libyan, and then Saudi funds, according 
to the best available public information [13] Pakistanis themselves deny any 
intention of shipping nuclear weapons to the Middle East, and know the 
opposition they would face at that if they were to do so— but there is still 
room for legitimate concern More subtly, the superpowers are concerned about 
the impact of regional proliferation on their own security and status There is 
less concern about a direct nuclear attack (although here the Soviets are 
vulnerable, as are same American facilities) , but more with the prospect that 
proliferation will dilute the "prestige" associated with the possession of 
nuclear weapons They are feared as equalizers by the great— which is part of 
their attraction for the less-great
While both superpowers are apparently hostile to regional nuclear 
proliferation, arri have committed themselves in the Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(and the U S has gone further in its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act), the course 
of regional proliferation may take one of several directions Public evidence 
indicates that both states are within easy reach of a nuclear device However, 
this may not lead to a test, or to a weapons system, or to large scale 
deployment Indeed, one or both states may position themselves at the edge of 
—  or sane distance from —  large scale weaponization without any public 
statement, test, or other indication of their plans In this they would be 
following the Israeli pattern They may even coordinate their nuclear cadence, 
both have an interest in keeping up with the other, but neither would find an 
outright nuclear arms race particularly useful
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If proliferation does take place, it would lessen the prospect of direct 
superpower involvement m  a regional conflict, especially if both India and 
Pakistan go nuclear This seems to be overwhelmingly more likely than only one 
of the two going nuclear, although there may be a tricky period between the tune 
the first and the second state declares itself to be m  possession of nuclear 
weapons It might, however, lead to greater superpower interaction with India 
and Pakistan, out of fear and prudence As in the case of China, there will be 
sane concern that these two states, not tightly linked to either superpower, 
will be unpredictable Both superpowers will fear irrational behavior and may 
even go so far as to prepare ABM or counter-force contingency plans They might 
also seek to promote C3 stability, and stay on the friendly side of both states 
Optimistically, the development of nuclear weapons by South Asian states will 
have an overall stabilizing effect, and might lead to greater caution by the 
superpowers m  attempting to manipulate regional states for their own ends 
However, the superpowers are not alone m  their concern over regional 
proliferation There is a strong likelihood that other states will view South 
Asian proliferation as of direct importance to their own interests There has 
been some discussion of a potential Israeli strike against Pakistani nuclear 
facilities [14] It seems unlikely that Israel would attempt this unless there 
was clear evidence of Pakistani nuclear cooperation with an Arab state or the 
actual movement of nuclear weapons to the Middle East China, also, has an 
interest in regional nuclear developments and one or more South Asian nuclear 
systems would have implications for China's own modest deterrent force One 
proliferation nightmare would be the evolution of a number of small and medium 
sized nuclear forces which could degrade Chinese or even superpower nuclear 
capabilities, and which would make targeting and deterrence too complicated for
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rational analysis
Incursions into South Asia
There have also been several conflicts between regional states and outside 
powers, the most notable one being the 1962 Sino-Indian war and the 1979 
invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union These are examples of a long 
history of competition for influence m  the limitrophic shatter-zone The names 
of the players have changed, but elements of the "great game" remain it still 
does matter to China, the Soviet Union, India, and Pakistan who controls the 
marchlands across their borders States such as Nepal and Afghanistan had 
survived by maintaining a tenuous balance between their powerful neighbors, 
recuit events in Afghanistan show how tenuous it can be, and how great is the 
price of miscalculation
There have also been incursions from the sea, although none have yet 
resulted m  conflict The U S deployed the nuclear carrier, Enterprise m  both 
1962 and 1971 m  an attempt to influence events on land (in the first instance, 
to deter a Chinese attack on India, in the second to threaten India during its 
invasion of Pakistan) With the expansion of Soviet seapower, there is now a 
heightened prospect of direct superpower competition m  the Indian Ocean region, 
and subsequent demands for support, facilities or even basing from littoral 
South Asian states We will consider this separately in the context of our 
discussion of India-Sri Lankan relations Historically more important, and 
potentially of greater regional significance,^ the continuing presence of China 
in territory claimed by India along India's northern borders
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China in South Asia
China and India fought a war m  1962 which was regarded at that time as a 
conflict between titans, an ideological struggle between communism and 
democracy, upon which the future of the world rested Such emotions have since 
been drained from the conflict, but the substantive disagreement over the proper 
demarcation of borders remains, and involves several tens of thousands of square 
miles Because the Sino-Indian conflict so closely parallels that between China 
and the Soviet Union (based on treaties concluded during Czanst and Imperial 
Chinese years), there is some reluctance on India’s part to compromise lest the 
Soviets be alienated, and some reluctance on China's part to yield lest the 
Soviets claim that as a precedent
This diplomatic stalemate will be broken when India’s dependence upon the 
Soviets declines, or when India calculates that closer relations with China will 
weaken that state's links to Pakistan, or when China concludes that it is better 
to try and embarrass the Soviets by generous terms to India rather than continue 
to treat the Indians as Soviet puppets Until that day comes, then the dispute 
can itself be used by any of the involved powers to make a diplomatic or 
military point It is unlikely that the substantive dispute will itself be 
grounds for a new conflict between India and China, as both countries have 
learned to live with the present arrangement— just as India and Pakistan have 
learned to live with the cease-fire line in Kashmir
III ETHNIC DISCONTENT AND GREAT POWER INTERESTS
India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka are multi-ethnic states India, with a 
larger population than Europe, is more linguistically, culturally and 
religiously diverse, Pakistan has four major ethnic/linguistic groups, and a
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fifth, the Bengalis, successfully broke up the old Pakistan m  1971 Sri Lanka 
is divided sharply into several groups which have varying racial, linguistic, 
religious and cultural identities
In India and Pakistan and Sri Lanka there are ethnic groups which forcibly 
resist political or cultural association Fearing absorption, or seeking 
autonomy, they have m  some cases fought the center for decades Such groups 
include the Baluch and Pathans m  Pakistan, and the Nagas and Mizos in India 
There are also major linguistic groups m  India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka which 
seek greater autonomy from central dominance Separatist movements have 
occurred among the Sindhis and Bengalis in Pakistan, the Sikhs, Nagas, and 
Tamils m  India and the Tamils in Sri Lanka Most of these center-periphery 
conflicts are exacerbated by the fact that many ethnic groups in South Asia have 
close ties to kinsmen across a national boundary Regionalism, or regional 
separatism is thus easily internationalized
In each of these countries, there is at least the temptation for outsiders 
to meddle and there are numerous examples of this occurring We cannot hope to 
deal with all such cases, since they are very numerous Most, however, do not 
threaten the integrity of the state (this is especially the case with India) or 
are not of interest to any great power (although they may be of interest to a 
South Asian neighbor) They share certain common features with the 
Sikh/Khalistan problem and Tamil/Sinhalese conflict they arise out of 
conflicting ethnic perceptions of vulnerability, a breakdown of agreement on 
shared goals and non-violent means of achieving such goals, and the corrosion of 
traditional social and religious systems However, they create larger problems 
only when coltrai authority is weakened or when an outside power is able to aid 
a dissident regional or ethnic group Thus, we will not devote attention to the
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Assamese, Naga, Mizo, Baluch, Sindhi or Kasimiri "liberation" or terrorist 
movements We shall instead concentrate upon two ethnic-linguistic separatist 
movements which have the greatest potential for disruption and external 
involvement the Sikh/Khalistan movement in the Indian Punjab and the Tamil 
separatist movement in Sri Lanka I do not include the Baluch, Sindhi or Pathan 
separatist movements of Pakistan in this group because 1) they are at present 
relatively dormant, or latent, 2) the central government of Pakistan has so far 
been able to contain these movements, and 3) no foreign power has yet tried to 
use them to destabilize or destroy the Pakistan government They are of 
potential significance, and could flare up quickly, but outside involvement is 
unlikely unless broader strategic circumstances were to change
From Punjab to Khalistan?
In one sense, there is no more purely domestic conflict in South Asia than 
that between the Indian government arri the alienated Sikh community The Sikhs 
are highly visible and concentrated Through very hard work they have rebuilt 
the Punjab into India's most prosperous state They are also one of the most 
"martial" of Indian communities, having dominated the Indian army for many 
years
However, they barely form a majority in Punjab Many Sikhs live outside 
the state, in such cities as Delhi, Bombay and Calcutta There is also a large 
foreign Sikh community especially in the U S , Canada and Great Britain Sikh 
politics have always been tumultuous and closely linked to the Gurdwaras (Sikh 
temples) Sikhs are mombers of both the Congress party and other parties, 
especially the Akali Dal, a purely Sikh party
When the Akalis began to demand more autonomy for the Punjab and certain
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symbolic, religious, and political concessions (a capital of their own, access 
to All-India radio, a ban on smoking m  certain cities), Indira Gandhi's 
response was to pursue a strategy of divide and rule, supporting extremist Sikhs 
so that the relative moderates would be outflanked and discredited [15] The 
strategy got out of hand as the Sikh extremists took over the Golden Temple and 
launched terrorist attacks against moderate Sikhs and Hindus in the Punjab 
These extremists were crushed on June 6, 1984, when the Indian Army occupied the 
Golden Temple Subsequently, several thousand Sikh soldiers mutinied, a few 
officers were killed and many terrorists, innocent young men, and mutineers fled 
to Pakistan for safe haven
Until this event, there had been no support for a fringe group that 
advocated "Khalistan," an independent homeland for the Sikh nation Khalistanis 
were based m  the U K , Canada and the U S , but had no significant following in 
India itself This began to change after the invasion of the Golden Temple,
after the anti-Sikh riots which followed Mrs Gandhi's assassination by one of
her Sikh bodyguards on October 30, 1984, the Khalistan movement received wider 
support although more outside of India than in it Figures are impossible to 
cane by, but it is doubtful whether more than 10% of Indian Sikhs seriously 
advocate Khalistan
What makes the Punjab crisis the most serious yet faced by independent 
India are its strategic ramifications The Sikhs are a vital component of the 
Indian armed forces 18% of the officers m  the Indian army and Indian air
force are Sikhs and about 12% of other ranks are Sikhs There are between
400,000 and 500,000 Sikh ex-servicemen living in the Punjab The Punjab itself 
is strategically vital to the Indian armed forces, and major road and rail 
routes to Kashmir run through the Punjab, simultaneous crises m  Kashmir and
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Punjab would find the army at a severe disadvantage Adding up these factors 
one has the makings of a grave national crisis should the Sikhs remain alienated 
and should there be a new war with Pakistan
This prospect has led to speculation by Sikhs and others about the breakup 
of India and the creation of Khalistan Such a state would presumably encompass 
the present Indian Punjab and perhaps parts of neighboring Indian states [16] 
Some Khalistani supporters press their case by arguing that Khalistan would 
become an anti-communist ally of the United States They liken it to Israel and 
argue that a tier of religiously oriented states, stretching from Israel to 
Khalistan (and including Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran) would be an effective 
barrier to Soviet communism If Khalistan were created soon, they promise, it 
would support the U S  m  fighting communism in Afghanistan Khalistan would be 
able to do this as it would 1) have a martial and well-disciplined population, 
already militarily well trained, 2) it would control vital resources such as 
water and foodgrains and thus be able to play a balancing role between India and 
Pakistan and 3) it would develop close ties with the U S
This line of argument is unrealistic It ignores likely Pakistani 
hostility to a strong and powerful Khalistan, it glosses over traditional Sikh 
schisms and internal conflicts, and it does not take into consideration 
Khalistan's land-locked location However, there have been signs of powerful 
foreign support for Khalistanis, including non-official American support 
Should the Indian government be unable to achieve a settlement with moderate 
Sikh opinion, or should another assassination trigger a new round of reprisals 
against the Sikhs, the vAiole process will inch further towards calamity At 
that point (as m  the case of Bangladesh) outside powers, near and distant, may
recalculate their own involvement
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Tamil Eelam and Oceanic Politics
In the 19th Century the British imported thousands of Indian Tamil laborers 
into the then Ceylon to work m  the tea plantations located in the northern part 
of the island These laborers came from the Madras Presidency of India, a mere 
twenty miles from Ceylon Earlier Tamil emigrants had already settled on Ceylon 
(now Sri Lanka), "Indian" and "Sri Lankan" Tamils now constitute about 20% of 
the total population of Sri Lanka In 1964, an agreement was worked out between 
India and Sri Lanka for the repatriation of some Tamils of recent origin [17]
However, elements of the Tamil population felt aggrieved Their working 
conditions and wages remained poor and they were often looked down upon by the 
Sinhalese, religious, racial an! linguistic differences also exist between the 
Tamil Hindu minority and the Buddhist Sinhalese majority What had become a 
difficult situation gave way to low level terrorism and guerilla war, then a 
massive anti-Tamil riot m  1983 which killed a large number of Tamils and has 
now reached a state of near insurrection m  parts of the island
There is very strong evidence that some Tamil terrorists are based m  and 
receive support from the Indian state of Tamilnadu [18] The guerillas are 
divided into several groups, some with PLO links, and the Tamil cause is openly 
supported by the state government of Tamilnadu Until recently, the Indian 
government has been reluctant to clamp down on terrorist camps, and claimed that 
no such raids are taking place from Indian soil In turn, they have accused the 
Sri Lankan government of unnecessarily inviting m  foreign military missions 
(apparently advisory groups from Israel and the British SAS) and harassing 
Indian fishermen
This dispute has its roots in local conditions and local problems
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However, because of 1) Sri Lanka's excellent naval facilities, 2) its desire to 
remain independent from Indian influence, 3) the conservative nature of the 
present government and 4) the difficulty it has experienced in containing the 
Tamil terrorists, there are important potential international and great power 
implications in the crisis
Soviet interests in the Indian Ocean are three-fold First, free access to 
the Indian Ocean allows the Soviets to use it to ship bulky items from one part 
of the Soviet Union to the other and thus take some of the load off the 
Trans-Siberian Railway Second, the Soviets have a growing political presence 
in many littoral states and access to ports at Aden, Camrahn Bay and a 
semi-permanent anchorage in the Indian Ocean Their small Indian Ocean fleet, 
and ships transiting the Indian Ocean, can play a supporting role in Soviet 
diplomacy in littoral states Finally, the Soviet navy shadows the American 
fleet m  the Indian Ocean region Right now most of these vessels are surface 
combatants, but trial patrols of SSBNs indicated the potential use of the Indian 
Ocean as a station for such boats A Soviet ASW capacity might then be 
important
American naval interests are implied m  the above The Rapid Deployment 
Force and CENCOM require surface vessels for any serious operation in the 
Persian Gulf or other areas in the littoral, the Indian Ocean is a vital route 
for tankers coming out from the Persian Gulf and going to Europe and 
(especially) Japan, it may be a useful place to deploy SSBNs, presenting any 
future Soviet ABM system with a southern threat
Sri Lanka figures in the above calculations because of its strained 
relations with India and its potential role as a western ally Even now 
Trincornaiee is used for U S fleet replenishment and recreation, it has the
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capacity to be upgraded into a first-class naval facility The only other 
significant Anencan naval facility in the region is at Diego Garcia, which 
cannot be expanded, although there are discussions about a facility at Christmas 
Island (controlled by Australia) The Soviets have no major facilities m  the 
Indian Ocean itself, although they did assist the Indians m  building a major 
port, drydock and other facilities at Visakhapatnam on India's east coast 
Should Sri Lanka's conflict with India increase (and I must stress the 
conditionality of that statement) , then there might be a closer tie, and even a 
naval agreement, between the U S and Sri Lanka Such an arrangement is 
unlikely to lead to greater Soviet access to Indian port facilities However, 
it will further strain Indo-Sri Lankan relations and might be resisted by a 
large segment of the Sri Lankan population Parenthetically, there would also 
be strong domestic opposition to any foreign base that might be established in 
Bangladesh or Pakistan, unless either state were under direct external threat 
and there was a credible offer of foreign assistance m  exchange for such 
facilities
IV SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
These concluding remarks will be divided into three parts same 
observations about conflict in South Asia, some about external involvement m  
the region, and speculation about possible future involvement
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Regional Conflict
Our brief survey seems to support two general conclusions about regional 
conflict The first is of a comparative nature, the second concerns the quality 
of such conflict
South Asia has witnessed persistent interstate conflict of varying types 
and persistent internal violence in three of its major states In this, it 
resembles the Middle East or Southeast Asia more than Latin America, although it 
has escaped the burden of heavy arms spending that characterizes the Middle 
East Further, the sources of such conflict have not declined and there is the 
possiblity of a nuclear breakout
Second, to a great degree regional levels of conflict are not only 
additive, but interactive At the superpower-national levels, the non-alignment 
of India retarded the formation of regional groupings based upon superpower 
alignments This has been less true in recent years, where many see an emerging 
India-Vietnam-Soviet-Ethiopia pattern, balanced against an emerging 
U S -Pakistan-China-ASEAN-Samaliá grouping I suspect this is more apparent 
than real However, the national-regional linkage is well established and 
pernicious Internal separatist and autonomist movements have regularly drawn 
encouragement— and at times, direct support— from outside states which challenge 
the country they oppose India's Naga rebels receive support frcm China, as the 
Khampa tribals of Tibet were once supported from India Sindhis and Baluch in 
Pakistan may receive support from India, Kashmiris m  India may receive support 
from Pakistan, and so forth The most recent case— still alleged, but of 
greatest potential— is Pakistani support for the Sikh Khalistan movement
The interactive pattern repeats itself at a higher level as individual
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South Asian states have regularly sought superpower or Chinese support against a 
regional neighbor Pakistan led the way, with close ties to the U S fron 1953 
to 1965 (followed by China), right now, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh also 
have close ties with the U S and China, m  large part to balance their dominant 
Indian neighbor India, of course, has an entangling military relationship with 
the Soviet Union that provides some protection against China, and considerable 
weaponry for use against Pakistan The informal system of Soviet-India and 
Pakistan- China resonates at regional and global levels
Lessons from Past External Intervention
There is a large literature as to whether outside powers tend to force 
themselves upon regions or whether they are drawn in by regional states Posing 
the problem this way suggests the obvious answer there may be a little bit of 
both, and the mix of internal pull vs external push will vary from region to 
region, issue to issue, and time to time Even then, some generalizations 
concerning South Asia's particular situation can be offered 
1 No superpower, or China, appears to regard South Asia as of vital 
geographic, economic or political importance No past outside intervention has 
been based upon such a factor, with the limited exception of the Soviet 
exploitation of natural gas from Afghanistan, and the even more distant prospect 
of a port facility on the Indian Ocean (which I discount very much as a motive 
for the Afghanistan invasion) The past physical involvement of the superpowers 
and China in the region have (with one exception) largely been transitory and 
stemming fron strategic or ex tra-regional considerations Thus, the U S "base" 
m  Peshawar was closed down when satellite observation of Soviet missile 
developments made it unnecessary, American nuclear intelligence and air defense
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operations in India, directed against China, were similarly terminated after 
becoming obsolete, the Soviets apparently were briefly given landing rights for 
aircraft enroute to Vietnam with military supplies, and the Soviet navy's 
extended presence in and near Chittagong port, ostensibly mine-clearing, was 
eventually wound up This is not to say that all or part of South Asia may not 
be of great and even increasing importance to one or more superpower and to 
China, but only to point out that their survival, and that of their closest 
allies (Western Europe and Japan in the case of the U S ) is not at issue in 
their regional South Asian involvement The only permanent presence of any 
military significance of an outside power is Chinese control over Aksai Chin 
With the notable exception of Afghanistan, the superpowers have come and gone 
at the invitation of local powers but have not stayed on
2 In South Asia, India (as the damnant power) has been least interested in 
having outside powers establish themselves locally on a permanent basis, whether 
in the form of a physical presence or an alliance relationship Pakistan's 
style has been somewhat different Pakistan has continually sought permanent 
outside allies and has granted them local intelligence and other facilities in 
the past, Pakistan requires an outside supporter to help it m  the regional 
balance India needs outside support to provide the marginal military increment 
against Pakistan, but more as a balance against the (largely faded) Chinese 
threat
Thus, Pakistan has sequentially had close ties with the U S , China and 
France and now the U S again (although not as intimate as in the original 
military relationship) India has had limited ties with the U S , Britain and 
the Soviet Union, and the latter fulfills two functions a weapons source and
28
tacit provider of an umbrella against a prospective Chinese nuclear threat 
Whereas Pakistan has sought entangling deep ties with outside states to further 
ensure that in time of crisis they would continue to support an "ally and a 
friend," India has tried to keep such outside powers at a distance and has 
deeply resented the limits placed upon aid received m  the past In recent 
years, however, Pakistan has begun to follow the Indian path and its new 
relationship with the U S  is quite circumscribed
3 The smallest South Asian states —  Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka —  have no 
chance of playing any significant military role or of deterring India They 
have, however, sought long-term outside political ties and limited amounts of 
military assistance to help offset their self-evident weaknesses A startling 
recent example of this was Sri Lanka's request for the permanent stationing of 
British troops to protect Sri Lankan democracy [19]
Perhaps of greatest long-range importance, the smallest regional states 
have been in the forefront of advocating a regional association, first proposed 
by Bangladesh's Zia ur-Rahman in 1980 This association, SARC (South Asia 
Regional Cooperation) has made halting progress, and has avoided strategic and 
security concerns However, it has considerable potential as a device by which 
the smaller regional states can 30m  together m  dealing with the largest —  
India —  and to this degree, may lessen their incentive to bring in outside 
powers
4 Both India and Pakistan have been regularly shaken by their external ties 
Pakistanis often cite the three (actually four) cutoffs of American military 
aid, they were also infuriated when the U S supplied aid to India from 1962-65, 
apparently without consultation India was angry with the U S cutoff of
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weapons in 1965, and very disturbed (although not publicly so) with Soviet 
"neutrality" in the 1965 war, when they felt that Pakistan should have been 
condemned for initiating the conflict This history has made both India and 
Pakistan wary of outsiders and has even given rise to the suggestion that they 
begin to purchase weapons frati each other
Future Involvement
Technology and strategy combine to suggest a number of ways m  which the 
superpowers will again become directly involved in subcontinental affairs other 
than through the provision of military equipment
1) Each superpower may seek or even be offered access to regional ports 
This is only likely if their utilization of the Indian Ocean increases 
significatly (especially if SSBN's are based there), and if India,
Pakistan,Bangladesh or Sri Lanka face an internal emergency which requires the 
support of a superpower Neither superpower is likely to request, or be granted 
such facilities if the prospective host country faces an external threat from a 
neighbor Even then, it is unlikely that such facilities will be granted
2) Also unlikely, but worth noting, would be regional cooperation with a 
superpower in an adjacent theatre, especially the Persian Gulf or in 
Afghanistan The former has been discussed a number of times Pakistan already 
has a small military presence in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries, if 
American and Pakistani interests run parallel in supporting a particular regime 
or state m  the Gulf, they may cooperate More likely would be superpower 
logistics support for such an operation
3) Future technologies may enhance the relevance of South Asian states to
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the superpowers, especially the U S The Strategic Defense Initiative has 
components which might be used to provide allied states with limited protection 
against external threat Some regional states, especially Pakistan, might also 
make useful sites for radar and other facilities in connection with an SDI 
system that ringed the Soviet Union Would a future Pakistani government 
provide the territory for such a facility in exchange for a degree of protection 
against strategic attack, or even in exchange for large quantities of 
conventional weapons'* Would the U S or the Soviet Union eventually be prepared 
to sell SDI components to India as well7
4) Perhaps more likely than any of the above, outside intervention in 
South Asia may be stimulated by the proliferation of nuclear weapons There is 
no consensus as to whether a line should be "drawn" concerning the next nuclear 
power, or where such a line should be drawn Many concede India’s nuclear 
status should Pakistan be actively prevented from going nuclear if diplomatic 
and aid instruments fail7 Should the U S assist Israel or India, or carry out 
an attack on Pakistani facilities itself7 Or, if Pakistan and India were to go 
nuclear, should the U S provide technical, intelligence and other assistance to 
ensure that their systems were as stable as possible7 Should a line then be 
drawn at the export of nuclear weapons outside of the region7 if so, who will 
enforce it7 Given the ambivalent attitude of China towards proliferation and 
the strong concerns of the Soviet Union, it is clear that any U S policy on 
these matters will have to take into account the views of these two states, 
although there is something to be said for unilateral action
5) Finally, the two truly revolutionarv agents of our time, the transistor 
and the wide-bodied }et, have combined to permanently alter the relationship
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between the elites and the leading économes of South Asian states on the one 
hand, and the United States on the other The American electronics culture has 
penetrated deeply into the region at the consumer level, it is now advancing to 
the production level, and India in particular will emerge as an intermediate 
transmitter of high technology to its neighbors and other regions
Meanwhile, the U S has become the country of choice for the education of 
South Asia's elite families These American-educated generations are a new and 
unpredictable factor they do not subscribe to the British derived 
anti-Americanism of the 1950s, and they understand America better However, 
their very contact with the U S makes than more sensitive to American slights, 
and can breed its own resentments
America's paradox is that it still regards the South Asian region as 
essentially peripheral to its own vital security interests, m  the meantime, it 
has established cultural and economic outposts in each South Asian state One
suspects that the true historic significance of this development will not be
/
fully assimilated until an essentially military definition of "security' is 
supplanted by one more in keeping with Anerica's ideological and economic, as 
well as military and strategic, interests
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